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Abstract 
 
As the window of opportunity for mitigating dangerous climate change grows ever 
smaller, proposals to use large scale technologies to control the earth‟s climate – 
known collectively as geoengineering – have started to be taken seriously by scientists 
and policy makers in the UK and elsewhere. During early 2010, the first series of 
major UK public engagement events on geoengineering took place – and were 
described in a report titled „Experiment Earth?‟ The events were designed to provide 
an opportunity for members of the public to engage with these emerging technologies 
at a very early stage. More specifically, they aimed to gauge the public‟s views on the 
future of research into geoengineering. This working paper reflects on the framing, 
process, methods and findings of the public dialogue, and offers a set of 
recommendations for future public engagement on this topic.  
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1. Introduction: From Climate Change to Climate Control 
 
1.1 Avoiding dangerous climate change: is mitigation and adaptation enough? 
 
The basic question of whether human activities are altering the climate is no longer 
seriously contended (IPCC, 2007; Royal Society, 2010). The rapidly increasing levels 
of greenhouses gases attributable to the burning of fossils fuels have already warmed 
the earth by approximately 0.8 degrees Celsius since the industrial revolution. Even if 
no more greenhouse gases were ever released into the atmosphere, at least another 0.7 
degrees of warming is likely to take place this century due to the time delay between 
the release of greenhouse gases and their warming effect. The effects of climatic 
warming are already visible in the arctic, where levels of summer sea ice are 
decreasing (ACIA, 2004).  
 
Predicting what will happen in the future is more difficult than documenting what has 
happened in the past. Exactly how much the earth will warm, exactly what the effects 
will be, and exactly where the impacts will be felt are ongoing questions that will 
never be fully answered. Uncertainty will remain an integral part of science in 
general, and climate science in particular (Budescu, Broomell & Por, 2009; Pollack, 
2005; Poortinga et al, 2001). However, there is a remarkable degree of agreement 
among scientists that left unchecked, climate change will have overwhelmingly 
adverse effects on human and natural systems – including increased floods, droughts 
and extreme weather events, lowered productivity from many large areas of existing 
farmland, ocean acidification and its associated effects on coral reefs and the 
biodiversity they sustain, migration due to climatic changes and conflict over 
dwindling resources (IPCC, 2007).  
 
Although the term is highly contested (Dessai et al., 2004; Anderson & Bows, 2008; 
2011), attention has focused on what would constitute „dangerous‟ climate change – 
broadly interpreted to indicate the point at which the effects attributable to climatic 
changes become unacceptably negative for global society (Lorenzoni, Pidgeon & 
O‟Connor, 2005; Oppenheimer, 2005). A loose political consensus has formed around 
the idea that a rise of more than two degrees Celsius in global temperatures (relative 
to pre-industrial revolution temperatures) constitutes dangerous climate change. As a 
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rise of 1.5 degrees is now all but inevitable, there is an extremely small window of 
opportunity in which to prevent dangerous climate change. In this context, with the 
global population and per-capita levels of greenhouse gases emissions continuing to 
rise at unprecedented rates, geoengineering has started to be considered as a means of 
responding to dangerous climate change alongside existing methods of mitigation and 
adaptation. 
 
1.2 Geoengineering 
 
The term „geoengineering‟ is used to refer to a wide range of proposals to use large-
scale technologies to slow down and/or reverse the effects of anthropogenic climate 
change.   It includes a diverse range of technologies, some of which are familiar and 
many that have never been tested on a meaningful scale. The link between these 
technologies is that they all have the potential to be deployed in order to control or 
alter the earth‟s climate. Very broadly, geoengineering technologies fall into two 
categories – proposals to remove a proportion of Carbon Dioxide from the atmosphere 
(Carbon Dioxide Removal – CDR) and proposals to reflect a proportion of sunlight 
away from the earth, thereby lowering global temperatures (Solar Radiation 
Management – SRM). The technologies implicated in these proposals vary 
enormously on many important dimensions. Some are well-understood but ineffectual 
unless deployed on an incredibly large scale (e.g. reforestation programmes to absorb 
carbon dioxide). Others are likely to be highly effective at reducing global 
temperatures but carry a high risk of unintended effects (e.g. the releasing of 
reflective sulphur particles into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight). The estimated 
cost, reversibility and speed with which the technologies can be implemented are also 
critical factors for evaluating geoengineering proposals (Royal Society, 2009).  
 
While questions about the efficacy and safety of these putative technologies are 
hugely important, proposals to geoengineer the climate represent much more than 
simply a set of technologies with attendant risks and benefits. The idea of 
geoengineering – the concept that we might intentionally alter the earth‟s climate – is 
riddled with social, moral, legal and ethical uncertainties arguably more profound and 
challenging than any of the questions relating to the technical feasibility of 
manipulating the climate (Corner & Pidgeon, 2010; Gardiner, 2011; Royal Society, 
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2009). The importance of engaging with the many non-technical questions raised by 
geoengineering has been acknowledged by many authors. Most notably, the Royal 
Society report “Geoengineering the climate: Science, governance and uncertainty”, 
stated that the future acceptability of geoengineering would be “determined as much 
by social, legal, and political issues as by scientific and technical factors” (Royal 
Society, 2009). Public dialogue, as part of these accompanying socio-cultural and 
ethical dimensions to technocratic discourses, was thus deemed of critical importance. 
  
1.3 Upstream public engagement 
 
Many new technologies are embraced by society with very little public debate or 
controversy, but others – like agricultural biotechnology (Bauer and Gaskell, 2002), 
or nuclear power and radioactive waste (Rosa and Clark, 1999) – raise significant 
social and ethical questions. Geoengineering looks likely to join this list of contested 
technologies, because of its potential for unintended global environmental 
consequences, ethical sensitivities, and the complex trans-boundary governance issues 
it raises (Corner & Pidgeon, 2010; Pidgeon et al, in press; also see Royal Society, 
2009; Rayner et al, 2010).  
 
A technology can be said to be upstream if significant research and development has 
not yet begun, public controversy about the topic is not currently present, and 
entrenched attitudes or social representations have not yet been established (Rogers-
Hayden and Pidgeon, 2007). All of these criteria apply to geoengineering‟s current 
position (see Corner & Pidgeon, 2010), as it is currently in a pre-development phase 
where many of its technical aspects – including questions around effectiveness, cost 
and risks – are highly uncertain. Geoengineering is therefore a prime example of an 
upstream technology – and there is a significant body of work describing and 
detailing „best practice‟ strategies for upstream public engagement (see, e.g., Corner 
& Pidgeon, 2010; Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon, 2007; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004).  
 
Initial interest in the public understanding of new or controversial scientific topics 
focused on the idea that public opposition to science and technology was linked to a 
„deficit‟ of knowledge that could be addressed by public engagement (Felt & Fochler, 
2010; Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Renn, 
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Webler & Wiedemann, 1995; Wynne, 2007). It was assumed that if only people knew 
more about a technology, they would come to see its benefits as outweighing its risks. 
This „deficit hypothesis‟ has been discredited by empirical evidence – multiple studies 
have failed to find a straightforward link between a lack of knowledge about science 
and opposition to it (Sturgis & Allum, 2004). But the deficit approach has also fallen 
out of favour for another reason – it embodies the old-fashioned idea that public 
engagement is a one-way process, rather than a dialogue between scientists and the 
public. 
 
It is now widely acknowledged that good practice in upstream engagement involves 
not only the transmission of information from „experts‟ to members of the public, but 
also a process of dialogue between scientists and the public. Upstream topics like 
geoengineering are of particular interest because they are not yet subject to entrenched 
attitudes or social representations (Rogers-Hayden & Pidgeon, 2007), and this means 
that public attitudes and views can legitimately be fed into decision making processes 
around the development and regulation of geoengineering. Interest in upstream 
engagement – and the broader notion of „responsible innovation‟ – in Europe can be 
partly attributed to the widely held perception that public engagement over 
agricultural biotechnology (i.e. GM) resulted in something of a „backlash‟. Wilsdon 
and Willis (2004) argued that public engagement on GM began too late for public 
input to impact on research and development. Following this line of reasoning, in 
order to be considered legitimate upstream engagement must be conducted before 
major investment decisions have been made, and relate more to values and notions of 
progress than products and processes of technical development (Rogers-Hayden & 
Pidgeon, 2007). 
 
The central purpose of the current paper is to reflect on the „Experiment Earth?‟ 
public dialogue events (and accompanying report) – the first major piece of upstream 
engagement on geoengineering. Having introduced the topics of climate change, 
geoengineering and the practice of upstream public engagement, we now offer an 
analysis of the design and methodology of the „Experiment Earth?‟ events, the way 
the subject of geoengineering was presented (or „framed‟), and the findings in the 
final report. The aim of this reflective paper is to allow lessons to be learnt from the 
„Experiment Earth?‟ public dialogue process, so that future public engagement on 
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geoengineering can be as best-informed by previous experience as possible. It should 
be emphasised from the outset that our reflections on „Experiment Earth?‟ are not 
intended to represent a negative assessment of it. We consider „Experiment Earth?‟ to 
have been a successful public engagement exercise, as the official evaluation report 
that accompanied the dialogue process is testament to (Collingwood Environmental 
Planning Limited, 2011). 
 
2. Reflections on the design and methodology of ‘Experiment Earth?’ 
 
2.1 Description of the ‘Experiment Earth?’ public dialogue events 
 
Representing the first major attempt at public engagement on geoengineering, during 
March and April in 2010, a series of public dialogue events were held in the UK, 
funded by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and other partners
1
. 
The events were designed to provide an opportunity for members of the public to 
engage with these emerging technologies at a very early stage. More specifically, they 
aimed to gauge the public‟s views on the future of research into geoengineering. As 
the funding body most likely to commission and support geoengineering research, 
NERC sought to establish public views on the moral, ethical and societal implications 
of funding research into geoengineering. The events were undertaken by the social 
research company Ipsos MORI and partners Dialogue by Design – specialists in 
public engagement. The resulting report was titled “Experiment Earth? Report on a 
Public Dialogue on Geoengineering” (Ipsos MORI, 2010). A further evaluation 
report, focussing on the extent to which the project achieved its stated aims, was 
conducted by Collingwood Environmental Limited (2011).
2
 
 
A total of seven public dialogue events were held – two in Birmingham, Cardiff and 
Cornwall (Events 1 and 2), and a reconvened event (with a small subset of the 
                                                 
1
 Other partners included Sciencewise, the Royal Society and the Living With Environmental Change 
Programme. 
2
 The Collingwood report had a brief that was quite distinct from the goal of the current paper. It was 
designed to establish whether „Experiment Earth?‟ had met its own objectives, including conformity to 
Sciencewise-ERC principles of good public engagement practice, and participants‟ satisfaction with the 
process. The overall objectives of the project were considered to have been met and participants were 
generally satisfied with their involvement. However several „learning points‟ were identified, and 
where these learning points overlap with the analyses offered in this paper, we draw on them to support 
our reflections.  
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participants from each of the three previous locations) in Southampton (Event 3).  
Around 30 people attended each event, with approximately 85 participants in total.
 3
 
 
2.2 The quality of the information provided 
 
The order in which participants received information and materials at each of the 
three events is described in detail in the appendices of the „Experiment Earth?‟ report 
– only a very short summary is provided here. In Event 1, an initial presentation about 
climate change led directly into the introduction of the topic of geoengineering 
(alongside mitigation and adaptation), and participants were then presented with the 
pros and cons of nine geoengineering technologies by rotating small groups around 
each technology. A further presentation identified strengths and weaknesses of the 
technologies (in terms of effectiveness, safety and value for money). Having been 
provided with these criteria, participants were then asked to map the technologies 
against them. As a post-event task, participants were asked to think more about the 
subject and come up with one question they would ask before initiating research on 
geoengineering. It is important to note that by the end of Event 1, there had been no 
formal mention of social, ethical or governance issues – although participants may 
have independently touched on these in discussions. 
 
In Event 2, following a summary of Event 1 and the nine technologies, a presentation 
on „ethics in science‟ was made. Four „scenarios‟ were then given to participants 
based on a different technology, and people were asked to consider these scenarios 
using ethical criteria. Lastly, participants saw short films demonstrating a range of 
moral arguments surrounding geoengineering from „talking head‟ experts.4  
 
In Event 3, participants were given an opportunity to summarise the conclusions from 
their regional groups, heard more detailed presentations about specific geoengineering 
                                                 
3
 There were also a series of other events that formed part of the Experiment Earth process – including 
discussion meetings with people likely to be at risk of flooding, open access events for people to drop 
in and talk about climate change and geoengineering, and an online survey. These aspects of the project 
are not discussed in the current report. 
4
 Two of the authors of this paper were directly involved in this process. Nick Pidgeon was part of the 
„Experiment Earth?‟ steering group, and was present as an expert participant at the Cardiff event. 
Adam Corner provided a pre-recorded short film on the social and ethical aspects of geoengineering for 
Event 2.    
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technologies and were provided with information about how NERC makes funding 
decisions (and how „Experiment Earth?‟ would feed into future decisions on 
geoengineering).  
 
Based on the materials in the appendix of the „Experiment Earth?‟ report and 
recordings of Event 3, it seems clear that the level of information provision and 
debate facilitation was very high (underscored by the generally positive assessment in 
the Collingwood evaluation report, 2011). Significant efforts were made to present 
information to participants in as unbiased and neutral way as is possible, and by the 
third event, participants were engaging with the issues raised by geoengineering using 
a high degree of sophistication.  In terms of facilitating a two-way process of 
dialogue, there were ample opportunities for participant-led discussions. However, 
there were also elements of the information provision process that could be improved 
in subsequent public engagement initiatives. 
 
One finding documented in the „Experiment Earth?‟ report was that some participants 
struggled to understand the complexities of climate science and geoengineering 
technologies. A similar point was raised in the Collingwood Environmental Planning 
(2011) evaluation report: although the materials presented to participants were 
generally assessed to be of high quality, some participants expressed concerns that the 
material was very „science-heavy‟. A possible explanation for this is that the 
presentations on climate change and geoengineering were quite technical, containing 
graphs and technical figures. While it is neither possible nor desirable to exclude 
technical terminology from a discussion of geoengineering, a less technical approach 
may have enhanced (rather than hindered) the engagement process. For example, in 
the initial presentation used to introduce the idea of accumulating carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere causing climate change, terms such as „parts per million‟ were 
introduced very early on. Similarly, quite technical-looking graphs depicting 
temperature increases and levels of greenhouse gas emissions formed a significant 
part of the presentation
5
.  
 
                                                 
5
 Although the use of graphs is not necessarily problematic – in fact, they can be valuable explanatory 
tools – the particular graphs used here required a fairly high level of expertise to interpret unaided. For 
example, the first graph shown to participants was labelled „Anomaly in degrees C compared to 1961-
1990 average‟. 
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Given what is known about the complex relationship between scientific knowledge 
and perceptions of risks and benefits, it is not necessarily a „flaw‟ in the design of 
„Experiment Earth?‟ that participants expressed a degree of confusion about technical 
details. But following this logic also suggests that an overly technical presentation of 
information is unlikely to be helpful for engagement – it is not necessary to provide 
much in the way of technical information in order for people to deliberate about 
technologies. This is because debates about technologies are only partially about the 
technical risks and benefits they pose – the social values and cultural worldviews that 
particular instantiations of technologies embody are also important (see, e.g., Stirling, 
2008).  
 
Complementing our analysis, one of the learning points identified in the Collingwood 
(2011) evaluation report was that members of the public should not be expected to 
„become scientists‟ in dialogue processes such as these. Instead, participants should 
be encouraged to bring their own (typically non-technical) expertise to the project. 
While this is a separate issue to participants‟ comprehension of specific technical 
terms, the two issues are related: over-reliance on technical terminology sends a 
strong signal to participants that they should be „thinking like scientists‟, when in fact 
it is their social intelligence that is more valuable.   
 
One additional consideration about the level of information provided to participants is 
that costs were estimated for putative technologies – with some described as relatively 
inexpensive ways of reducing carbon dioxide levels, and others labelled as relatively 
expensive. While it is certainly true that different geoengineering technologies will 
have quite different costs associated with them, the technologies are currently at such 
early stages of development that cost estimates are indicative at best (Royal Society, 
2009). This suggests that undue emphasis should not be placed on the financial 
comparability of competing technologies until more information is available.  
 
2.3 The order in which the information was presented 
 
Although the stated aim of the „Experiment Earth?‟ project was to identify the moral, 
ethical and societal implications of funding research into geoengineering, an explicit 
discussion of these issues did not take place until Event 2. The balance of 
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„Experiment Earth?‟ was weighted very heavily towards the physical risks and 
benefits of the geoengineering technologies discussed. Focussing so strongly on the 
pros and cons of the various technologies is likely to have framed subsequent 
discussions in a particular way. An intuitive question for participants to ask – whether 
or not it was explicitly framed in this way – would have been “which of these 
technologies is the one with the most promise?” 
 
This is only one possible question that could be asked about geoengineering, and it is 
one that is very technology-focused. Crucially, it is a question that one would ask 
once other more basic answers had been established – for example, is the intentional 
manipulation of the climate ever ethically acceptable? To the extent that participants 
in Event 1 of „Experiment Earth?‟ were not encouraged to ask these questions prior to 
considering the pros and cons of individual technologies, an important opportunity for 
gathering public opinion on the concept of geoengineering may have been missed.  
 
There is some evidence from the audio recordings of Event 3 that participants were 
not explicitly encouraged to identify the „best‟ or „worst‟ technologies – an expert 
delivering a presentation to the whole group clarified the aim of the dialogue in the 
following way:   
 
“We‟re not hoping you‟re going to tell us „you should be doing 
biochar‟ or „you should be doing space mirrors‟ or whatever, but it‟s 
that sense of…of what parameters we‟d use to decide what to do, and 
in particular if there are things that you think we should not be doing 
because you think the risks are too high”. (Male expert in Event 3) 
 
Communicating this sentiment to participants is important – experience with other 
emerging technologies suggests that the particular application that a technology is 
instantiated in matters a great deal to public opinion of the underlying technology. For 
example, Bauer and Gaskell (2002) showed that people were more positive about 
biotechnology for human health applications compared to agricultural uses. Similarly, 
in deliberative work discussing nanotechnology with members of the public in both 
the UK and USA, energy applications were seen as relatively unproblematic 
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compared to health and human enhancement issues, with the latter felt to raise 
particular ethical and societal questions (Pidgeon et al, 2008).  
 
2.4 The ‘climate catastrophe’ framing 
 
In addition to the heavy early focus on technical risks and benefits, the „Experiment 
Earth?‟ facilitators and experts explicitly used the notion of a „climate catastrophe‟ or 
„climate crisis‟ on several occasions. This is the idea that geoengineering may be 
necessary to deal with a climatic emergency, especially if other options have failed. In 
the audio recordings of Event 3, several of the experts prompted discussion of the 
technologies using questions explicitly linking geoengineering to a climatic 
emergency. For example, one expert asked a small group of participants “What if life 
gets so bad that we need an emergency solution, isn‟t it worth researching what to do 
now?” (Expert in Event 3). 
 
It is difficult not to answer this question in the affirmative – few would seek to deny 
the knowledge necessary to deal with a scenario where life is so bad that an 
emergency solution is needed. The question is whether this is a reasonable framing to 
provide people with. Although the notion of climatic „tipping points‟ (non-linear, 
abrupt and effectively irreversible changes in the climatic system) are a genuine cause 
for concern, there is an ongoing debate about whether it is possible to differentiate a 
„climate crisis‟ from the more mundane notion of climatic change (see, e.g., Hulme, 
2009). In fact, the very notion of „dangerous‟ climate change is contested – for some 
nations (e.g. the low-lying islands that comprise the Maldives), a rise in global 
temperatures of only 1.5 degrees Celsius would constitute a major risk. For others, a 
global change of 2 degrees is unlikely to pose insurmountable problems (at least at a 
national level).  
 
It is true that the consideration of geoengineering techniques is borne out of concern 
that current mitigation and adaptation strategies will not be enough to prevent 
dangerous climate change. It is also true that there is some scope for a large-scale 
technological intervention to act as a rapid response to changes in the climate. But 
presenting geoengineering to people as a possible response to a climatic emergency is 
problematic, especially if linked to the need to conduct research at an early stage: It 
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provides a very strong framing of necessity, which is likely to have artificially 
enhanced the acceptability of conducting research into these technologies. 
 
2.5 Use of imagery 
 
Many geoengineering technologies do not yet exist. This poses a challenge for using 
imagery to depict certain technologies, as visual images are only artists‟ impressions 
of what scientists think the technologies will ultimately look like. In „Experiment 
Earth?‟ several images of geoengineering technologies were used to help participants 
understand what they might look like if they were deployed. As an example, we focus 
on the image used to depict air capture (Image 1). 
 
 
Image 1: An artist‟s impression of how air capture could be deployed. Image from the 
handouts provided to participants in „Experiment Earth?‟ Event 1. 
 
The „Experiment Earth?‟ team explained that the image used to depict air capture was 
an artists‟ impression rather than an actual photo. However, the image was obviously 
designed to be indicative of a possible use of this technology – otherwise it would not 
have been used. Visual images convey a great deal of information, which is why they 
are useful as explanatory aides. But they can also convey potentially misleading 
information (as the „Experiment Earth?‟ authors acknowledge with regards to the 
image of biochar, which seemed to be interpreted as evidence that it was a space-
effective way of geoengineering). The image used to depict air capture in „Experiment 
Earth?‟ contained a great deal of information that did not relate directly to the 
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expected physical appearance of air capture technology. The image shows air capture 
technology interspersed with wind turbines, dwarfed in size by the length of the 
turbines‟ blades. The air capture vents and wind turbines are shown unrealistically 
close to a motorway – but the overriding impression is one of normality. The viewer 
of the picture is invited to imagine a world in which air capture blends seamlessly into 
the existing transport infrastructure (more seamlessly, in fact, than sources of 
renewable energy like wind turbines). It is a world in which people still drive cars – 
one that looks much the same as the present day. 
 
Perhaps a future that involves geoengineering will resemble the one depicted in the 
image – but it is an almost utopian vision of how geoengineering technologies will 
slot into society. Given that the purpose of public dialogue events like „Experiment 
Earth?‟ is to elicit – rather than provide – these kinds of judgments, it seems important 
to consider carefully the imagery used in public engagement events on 
geoenegineering in the future. 
 
2.6 Use of language 
 
When discussing emergent technologies and scientific development, it is a difficult 
and delicate exercise to express their potential benefits without unintentionally 
implying that these (putative) benefits are in fact concrete, provable advantages.  In 
the „Experiment Earth?‟ materials, an advantage stated for biochar was that it 
„addresses the cause of climate change directly‟.  Whilst it certainly could aid in the 
reduction of CO2 held in the atmosphere and oceans, biochar on its own is unlikely to 
ever be able to be deployed at a scale which could deal with all cumulative emissions.  
It is unclear how much emphasis was placed on the uncertainties related to future 
cumulative emissions and how these may impact on the effectiveness of all forms of 
geoengineering – the more CO2 that is released into the atmosphere, the less scope 
there is for biochar (or any other approach) to make a substantial impact on overall 
atmospheric levels.  But such a framing also risks obfuscating the reasons that green 
house gas emissions are so high in the first place (including industrialisation, the 
embeddedness of socio-technical systems, high-energy lifestyles and behaviours, etc). 
Yes, biochar removes CO2 from the atmosphere and stores it in the ground – and so 
in a narrow sense, it addresses the cause of climate change (CO2) directly. But why is 
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there so much CO2 in the atmosphere? A presentation of CDR technologies as 
addressing the root cause of climate change may engender the seductive belief that 
geoengineering could „solve‟ climate change irrespective of conventional forms of 
mitigation and adaptation.  As with the use of imagery, there is a danger of a „business 
as usual‟ approach being unwittingly promoted through particular linguistic 
presentations. It may be that participants subscribe to this view – but this is for them 
to decide, not for public engagement researchers to prompt. 
 
3. Reflections on the ‘Experiment Earth?’ findings 
 
3.1 Key findings from ‘Experiment Earth?’ 
A summary of „Experiment Earth?‟ participants‟ views about specific geoengineering 
technologies is provided in Table 2.  
 
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
Afforestation and Biochar. Consistently 
highlighted as preferred methods. Seen as 
„natural‟ approaches and preferred for 
this reason. 
SRM gained less support overall, as it 
was perceived not to tackle the root cause 
of climate change (greenhouse gasses). 
Iron Fertilisation and Ocean Liming. 
Level of support for ocean-based 
methods was consistently low, although 
at the final event people were more 
prepared to consider these. 
Cloud Whitening and Sulphate 
Particles were the most positively 
received (particularly the former) of the 
generally disliked SRM technologies, but 
were not endorsed by a majority.  
Air Capture. Support for this increased 
throughout the deliberative events. Could 
be carried out at a local level without 
international regulation, and the results 
seen more quickly than afforestation.   
Mirrors in Space were seen as expensive 
and risky, while White Roofs were 
viewed as likely to be ineffective and 
infeasible. 
 
Table 2: „Experiment Earth?‟ Participants‟ Views on Different Geoengineering 
Proposals  
Source: adapted from Ipsos-Mori (2010, p.2)  
 
Participants were encouraged to elucidate „underlying principles‟ that determined the 
acceptability of different geoengineering proposals. The key criteria the participants 
generated are displayed in Table 3: 
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Principle Rationale 
Effects on Mitigation Geoengineering should not conflict with, 
and wherever possible augment, 
mitigation efforts 
Supporting ‘Natural’ Processes 
 
Most participants believed that natural 
systems were balanced and self-
contained. An affective judgement, most 
believed that geoengineering should be 
considered in terms of its impacts on 
natural systems, and this formed an 
important context to their other opinions 
on geoengineering 
Controllability Scientists should not interfere with 
complex natural systems without detailed 
assessments of consequences. 
Reversibility Scientists needed to retain control and be 
able to „switch off a project‟, and 
therefore needed to be sure that research 
and deployment could be reversed if 
necessary. Small steps might help to 
achieve this. 
Effectiveness Scientists should weigh up core benefits 
against costs, taking account of the 
amount of CO2 removed and overall 
global temperature reductions. A range of 
costs should be considered (carbon, 
financial, future, opportunity, 
investment).  
Timing Governments and other authorities should 
set a timetable for action, and establish 
when the need for action would become 
urgent (i.e. define a „climate 
emergency‟). The public should be 
informed, so they can give or withdraw 
support, as new information about this is 
gained. 
Regulation and Equity Where there were trans-boundary 
implications international governments 
should come together to decide on 
regulation, to ensure that effects and 
benefits are distributed equitably across 
the globe. The long term-consequences 
ought to be considered, as should the 
voices of those in the developing world. 
Table 3: „Experiment Earth?‟ Participants‟ Views on Geoengineering Research and 
Research Governance 
 
Source: adapted from Ipsos-Mori (2010, p.2-3)  
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Given the constraints in accessing the primary data from „Experiment Earth?‟ we 
sought to comment only briefly on the key findings in the current paper.  
 
3.2 Differences between technologies and the CDR and SRM categories 
 
Given the range of geoengineering proposals presented to participants, it is 
unsurprising that people differentiated between technologies, and particularly between 
the two categories of geoengineering which are rooted in such different philosophies. 
In general, CDR approaches were more popular than SRM approaches, and these 
findings are supported by initial survey work (Spence et al, 2010). As part of a 
nationally representative UK survey of almost 1,800 people in early 2010, a number 
of questions about geoengineering were asked. Self-reported knowledge about 
geoengineering was found to positively predict, albeit weakly, CDR support – that is, 
the more people reported that they knew something of geoengineering in general, the 
more likely they were to support the use of CDR techniques. However, knowledge 
about geoengineering was a negative predictor of support for SRM – that is, the more 
people reported they knew, the less they supported the development of SRM 
techniques (see Pidgeon et al, in press, for more detail). An important task for future 
public engagement will be to investigate in more detail the reasons that people 
distinguish between CDR and SRM approaches – but the available evidence 
(deliberative and survey-based) suggests that CDR technologies are generally 
preferred.  
 
3.3 The link between climate change mitigation and geoengineering 
 
It is noteworthy that increased concern about climate change seemed to be linked to 
greater support for geoengineering. This is also supported by initial survey data – 
Pidgeon et al (in press) found that concern about climate change was positively 
correlated with support for geoengineering in general. A key conclusion from 
„Experiment Earth?‟ was that most participants accepted the need for geoengineering 
on the basis that mitigation might not be effective enough. This relates directly to the 
concern expressed earlier in the paper that the „Experiment Earth?‟ team may have 
placed too much emphasis on the notion of mitigation strategies being insufficient to 
deal with a climate „catastrophe‟, although the report acknowledges this influence. 
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However, there is one other aspect of the way in which mitigation and geoengineering 
approaches were described that raises important questions about the way in which the 
framing of the information may have influenced the results obtained. The „Experiment 
Earth?‟ report states on Page 8 that: 
 
“It is proving difficult to establish global political action on tackling 
climate change” (Page 8, Ipsos MORI, 2010). 
 
On Page 28, it is stated that participants were informed that mitigation on a large scale 
will require political will. Although accurate, the notion that this is a „disadvantage‟ 
of mitigation strongly implies that political will is not a barrier to geoengineering 
approaches (c.f. Gardiner, 2011). In fact, the entire „Plan B‟ narrative that features so 
strongly in broader discussions of geoengineering is predicated on the assumption that 
geoengineering is somehow more straightforward than mitigation or adaptation – 
something that should be tried if the other approaches fail.  
 
While it is possible that geoengineering technologies could be pursued independently 
of governance schemes, most commentators have advocated international regulation 
as a prerequisite for (at least some) geoengineering technologies (see, e.g., Royal 
Society, 2009; Rayner et al, 2010). This means that deployment and even large-scale 
research on geoengineering is likely to require significant political will, and public 
support, in exactly the same way as any other policy option would do. For some, the 
notion of climatic engineering is less problematic than what could be construed as 
„social engineering‟ through behavioural changes, but this is a personal judgment. 
Although the „Plan B‟ narrative was not dominant in Experiment Earth, the 
implication of identifying political will as a „disadvantage‟ of mitigation approaches 
is that this would not be as much of a barrier for geoengineering.  
 
3.4 Naturalness 
 
The report concluded that perceived naturalness was a key theme that underpinned 
many of the principles participants articulated for assessing geoengineering proposals, 
and claimed that: 
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“Across the dialogue events, processes were seen more positively 
when they were thought to be natural” (P32, Ipsos MORI, 2010). 
 
One of the recommendations contained in the „Experiment Earth?‟ report for research 
funders and decision makers (see Table 4) was to consider participants‟ concerns 
about perceived „naturalness‟ of different geoengineering technologies. As perceived 
naturalness was such an important underlying theme, it is critical to understand how 
this issue was dealt with by the research team, in terms of the language and imagery 
used to convey different aspects of geoengineering technologies. 
 
Based on longstanding work documenting the qualitative factors influencing the 
public perception of risk (Slovic, 2000), Pidgeon et al (in press) argued that one 
important factor in determining public attitudes towards geoengineering technologies 
would be the extent to which they were perceived as „natural‟. Pidgeon et al suggested 
that: 
 
“It is not at all difficult to see how some of the current proposals for 
geoengineering (e.g. iron fertilisation, sulphate aerosols) might indeed 
have several of the qualitative risk characteristics which make 
technologies less acceptable to people, something which may also help 
to explain their current sensitivity amongst a number of external 
commentators and environmental groups” (Pidgeon et al, in press, p9). 
 
One of the central conclusions from the „Experiment Earth?‟ report was that perceived 
naturalness did indeed play an important role in determining public attitudes. Some of 
the technologies discussed (e.g. afforestaion and biochar) genuinely do involve 
scaling up „natural‟ processes, and unsurprisingly, these techniques were seen by 
participants as most strongly embodying the notion of naturalness. The challenge for 
facilitators with these technologies was to accurately convey the scaling-up that 
would be required in order for them to be effective – a concern noted by the 
„Experiment Earth?‟ team in their own report.  
 
However, it seems likely that the some of the technologies identified as being 
„natural‟ were (unintentionally or otherwise) presented in this way by the research 
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team and experts at the deliberative events. The analogies used to describe certain 
technologies alluded very strongly to a „naturalness‟, while others did not. For 
example, chemical vents for capturing carbon dioxide from the air were repeatedly 
described as „artificial trees‟, while the release of sulphur particles into the 
stratosphere was reported to participants as being „no different to a volcano‟. While 
these characterisations might be technically accurate, they also provide a powerful 
framing: that the way to think about these technologies is by analogy to existing 
„natural‟ processes.  
 
Leaving aside any discussion of what constitutes a „natural‟ process, participants 
presented with technologies that are „like trees‟ or „similar to volcanoes‟ are being 
provided with a strong interpretive frame.
6
 The fact that participants in „Experiment 
Earth?‟ were concerned with naturalness is not surprising – well-established risk 
research from a number of different technological domains suggests that this is an 
important factor for determining risk judgments (Slovic, 2000). But presenting some 
technologies using a direct analogy to natural processes is likely to have influenced 
which technologies were perceived in this way. For example, one participant in Event 
3 summarising a small group discussion from earlier in the day stated that: 
 
“I had concerns that sulphate particles were not very natural…but the 
scientists explained to us that obviously they were natural, and with 
the association with the volcano recently, they explained it was the 
same sort of thing and that there were particles even in this room” 
(Female participant in Event 3). 
 
Finally, public concerns about naturalness were described in general by the 
„Experiment Earth?‟ report as reflecting a version of the „trolley problem‟ – the well 
known ethical dilemma that shows people differentiate between intentional and 
unintentional acts. But while notions of intention are likely to play a role in 
                                                 
6
 At the time that the public dialogue was taking place, the Eyjafjallajokull volcano was erupting in 
Iceland, causing severe disruption to aviation across Northern Europe. It could be argued, therefore, 
that drawing an analogy with a volcano would have been more likely to act as a negative reference 
point for participants evaluating sulphate aerosol technologies. However, the finding from „Experiment 
Earth?‟ that processes were perceived more positively the more they were seen to be natural suggests 
that „naturalnesss‟ framings should be treated with caution (whichever direction they are likely to bias 
participants‟ responses). 
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determining whether something is perceived as natural or not, it is also possible that 
participant interest in naturalness is a deeper expression of concern about the 
continuation of the industrial project that is now know to have had a significantly 
negative impact on the „natural‟ environment. Participants‟ concerns about 
naturalness may in fact be reflecting a deeper question about whether geoengineering 
is sustainable (in the broadest sense). 
 
4. Recommendations for future public engagement on geoengineering 
 
4.1 Recommendations from ‘Experiment Earth?’ 
 
„Experiment Earth?‟ concluded with a set of nine recommendations (summarised in 
Table 4).    
 
Recommendations from this study for NERC and other research funders and decision 
makers are to: 
1. Take account of the 
results of this study 
when discussing 
geoengineering 
priorities in future. In 
particular, recognise 
that information about 
the public‟s opinions 
and understanding of a 
subject can complement 
and support information 
from scientists and 
policymakers in the 
decision-making 
process. 
2. Ensure future 
plans for 
geoengineering 
research and 
deployment take 
place in the 
context of the 
continuing need 
for mitigation, 
considering the 
moral hazard and 
opportunity costs 
faced in research 
decisions. 
 
3. Consider 
participants‟ 
concerns around 
perceived 
„naturalness’ in 
discussions 
about future 
geoengineering 
research and 
deployment. 
4. Take account of 
participants‟ specific 
concerns that 
geoengineering research 
and 
Deployment should be 
assessed in terms of 
controllability; 
reversibility; effectiveness 
in terms of costs and 
benefits; timeliness; and 
potential for fair 
regulation. 
Recommendations for future public engagement on geoengineering research: 
5. Continue to engage the public 
with geoengineering research, as 
requested by participants in this 
dialogue. Dialogue should be an 
on-going process, as public opinion 
is dependent on context and will 
change over time. Dialogue may 
also be required at different stages 
of research and deployment, to 
engage the public on specific issues 
relating to different technologies. 
6. Keep the public informed about 
the efficacy, costs and side effects 
of any technologies that are 
researched, as research progresses 
and as such information becomes 
available. This helps the public to 
stay involved in the decision-
making process, and ensures that 
their views are based on the most 
up to date information. 
7. Further 
dialogue activity 
should include 
people from the 
developing 
world, and 
scientists from 
all over the 
world. 
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Recommendation for communicating climate science: 
8. Future science communication activities on 
climate change, including any future 
geoengineering dialogue, should take account of 
the „Communicating Climate Science‟ findings in 
this report. These include: public awareness of 
climate science and the scale of climate systems, 
communicating uncertainty, trust in science, 
awareness of how science is done, and differences 
between the „scientific‟ view and the public view 
of issues. 
9. There is also a need for further 
dialogue on the subject of „naturalness‟ 
to establish what this term means to the 
public (see recommendation 3, above) 
and explore public attitudes to, and 
scientific understanding of, the role of 
humans in natural systems and 
interactions between humans and the 
environment. 
 
Table 4: „Experiment Earth?‟ recommendations. 
 
It is our view that these are valuable and appropriate recommendations. The 
recommendations that follow are derived from our preceding analyses of the context, 
method, framing and results of „Experiment Earth?‟. They are not intended to replace 
or challenge the recommendations of „Experiment Earth?‟, but rather to provide 
additional guidance for future public engagement on geoengineering. 
 
4.2 Aim for less complexity in the presentation of the science 
 
It is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate technical language from discussions of 
geoengineering. However – and especially considering participants‟ concerns about 
the difficulty of some of the material presented – it is important to provide only as 
much technical information as people are comfortable with. This will obviously vary 
according to the particular audience, but assuming that participants in public 
deliberations represent a range of educational and socio-economic backgrounds, every 
attempt should be made to make the materials as straightforward as possible. This 
could be achieved in a number of ways, including removing or simplifying graphs and 
technical figures (which are unfamiliar to those without a science background) and 
presenting fewer examples of geoengineering technologies. While presenting fewer 
technologies would inevitably limit the range of information available to participants, 
it might also help to avoid the technologies being seen as a list of ranked preferences 
(obscuring more general discussions about the concept of geoengineering).   
 
4.3 Go beyond framing geoengineering as a set of technologies 
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In many respects there is no single thing called geoengineering and accordingly (as 
has also been argued in the case of nanotechnologies – see Rogers-Hayden and 
Pidgeon, 2007), it makes better sense to signal this heterogeneity by referring to 
„geoengineering proposals‟ as a plurality of approaches. But beyond this 
acknowledgment of the plurality of geoengineering technologies lies a deeper issue: 
geoengineering is much more than just a set of technologies. As Felt and Fochler 
(2010) have argued, there is a danger that participatory public engagement is still 
implicitly undertaken as a means to avoid societal dissent, “…educating and pacifying 
unruly publics resistant to top-down information” (Felt & Fochler, 2010, p221).   
 
The evidence presented in „Experiment Earth?‟ (and beginning to be documented 
elsewhere – see Pidgeon et al, in press) suggests that different instantiations of 
geoengineering will produce very different responses from members of the public. 
Inevitably, some will be preferred to others. But it is crucial at this very early phase in 
the development of geoengineering research that great care is taken to allocate 
appropriate significance to the social and ethical questions that these technologies 
raise. An important precedent in this regard are nanotechnologies – in deliberative 
work discussing nanotechnology with members of the public in both the UK and USA 
its energy applications were seen as relatively unproblematic compared to health and 
human enhancement issues, with the latter felt to raise particular ethical and societal 
questions (Pidgeon et al, 2008).  Such different attitudes and responses across 
application domains of the same underlying technology can be explained using 
theoretical concepts from work on public perceptions of technological risk, where 
factors over and above probability and severity of harm are known to differentiate the 
acceptability of proposals. People may be intrigued by the prospect of a 
nanotechnology-enhanced tennis racket, but concerned by the notion of engineering 
novel particles at the atomic scale. Similarly, the notion of an „artificial tree‟ that can 
absorb carbon dioxide may be popular, but the assumption that necessitates its use – 
that we have failed to mitigate climate change and therefore have had to resort to 
putting excess carbon underground – may make people feel uneasy. 
 
For example, on page 25 of the „Experiment Earth?‟ report, one participant from the 
Cornwall event is quoted as asking:  
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“If we are capturing CO2, are we not just capturing something that will 
need letting out in future?” (Participant from Cornwall event, p25, 
Ipsos MORI, 2010) 
 
From a scientific perspective, it is easy to dismiss such seemingly simplistic logic. 
However, whether or not CO2 is likely to leak out of the ground is only part of what 
this statement is about. The notion of storing up problems for the future, of failing to 
address the root cause of a problem, is a concept familiar from many moral and 
political discussions – government debt and spending is a pertinent current example. 
The underlying principle – that a problem should be dealt with now, and not swept 
under the carpet (or pumped underground) for later on, is a fundamental one (reflected 
in the strong preference among „Experiment Earth?‟ participants for geoengineering 
not to distract from mitigation efforts).  
 
Presenting geoengineering as a technology, or even a set of technologies, before 
permitting adequate time for reflecting on the underlying principles of geoengineering 
as a type of response to climate change is likely to fundamentally alter the public‟s 
views of it. Future public engagement exercises should take care to ensure that a 
discussion of technical pros and cons is preceded by an opportunity for social and 
ethical concerns to be deliberated. This will ensure that geoengineering is framed as 
more than simply a set of technologies. 
 
4.4 Think carefully about framing – ‘climate catastrophes’, ‘artificial trees’ and 
‘Plan B’  
 
While it is possible that large-scale technologies might be deployed in response to a 
sudden or unexpected change in the global climate, there is no consensus among 
climate scientists of what would constitute a climatic „emergency‟. In fact, 
environmental organisations and commentators have been repeatedly criticised for 
placing undue emphasis on apocalyptic visions of „climate catastrophes‟ or sudden, 
irreversible changes in the climate system (see, e.g., Hulme, 2009). While abrupt, 
non-linear climatic changes become increasingly likely as global temperatures 
increase (Schneider, 2004), it does not necessarily follow that we will be able to 
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identify or respond to them using large-scale technologies such as geoengineering. 
Interestingly, participants in „Experiment Earth?‟ identified a need for the government 
to define what is meant by a climate emergency, so that it would be clearer when 
geoengineering would be „needed‟ (p41).  
 
One of the methodological challenges of upstream engagement is to provide sufficient 
information to participants (so that they can form a view) but without overly 
constraining or biasing the information or contextual background frames used 
(Stirling, 2008). With regard to geoengineering, the way the climate change issue is 
developed, the range and detail of technologies described, and whether 
geoengineering is presented within a narrative of climate catastrophe or alternatively 
as merely one of a range of potential response options, would all be likely to affect 
responses. To the extent that geoengineering is being framed (intentionally or 
unintentionally) as a method of responding to a „planetary emergency‟, then its 
legitimacy is likely to be increased. Future public engagement work should use the 
„climate catastrophe‟ narrative with caution – firstly because there is a genuine 
question about whether a climatic „emergency‟ could in fact be easily defined 
(Hulme, 2009), and secondly because it is a powerful framing. 
 
Future research should also be cautious in describing particular geoengineering 
technologies as „natural‟, or using direct analogies with natural processes such as the 
absorption of carbon dioxide by trees. Given the importance that participants 
attributed to the naturalness of the different technologies described, there is a need to 
ensure that technologies are not associated with the positive notion of „naturalness‟ by 
analogy if, in fact, they are highly artificial. While it may be technically appropriate to 
describe air capture units as „artificial trees‟, the analogy is likely to have resonance 
beyond its intended technical meaning – acting to reassure people that the technology 
is familiar, tried-and-tested, or environmentally benign. In any case, the idea that there 
is a clean distinction between „nature‟ and other aspects of human societies is widely 
disputed (see, e.g., Macnaghten & Urry, 1998) suggesting that any appeal to 
naturalness as a feature of a geoengineering technology is likely to be problematic. 
 
Finally, careful thought should be given to the way in which the link between political 
will and geoengineering is developed. Although geoengineering technologies were 
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never explicitly described in „Experiment Earth?‟ as more politically straightforward 
to initiate than mitigation strategies, the implication of describing  existing strategies 
as politically difficult to implement is that geoengineering will be less so. But any 
responsible attempt to use geoengineering technologies will require the investment of 
significant political capital. Caution should be exercised, therefore, in presenting 
geoengineering technologies as potentially less politically problematic than 
mitigation. It may be that this is true – but at present there is no way of making that 
judgment, and in any case, individuals are likely to have different views.  
 
4.5 Be mindful of unintended impacts of visual imagery and language 
 
Because so many putative geoengineering technologies have not yet been developed 
to a stage where accurate visual impressions of them can be provided, using images of 
geoengineering poses a challenge for public engagement research. Images are 
certainly valuable explanatory tools – but they can also be misleading.  At a 
minimum, visual images should be clearly labelled as „artists‟ impressions‟ if they 
depict a technology that does not yet exist. But even clearly labelled images should 
attempt to present the technologies in as neutral a way as possible.  There is a danger 
that visual images will convey unintended information to participants – and the same 
risk applies to descriptions of the (potential) risks and benefits of geoengineering 
technologies. CDR techniques may address the root „cause‟ of climate change in the 
sense that they tackle levels of CO2, rather than treat the symptoms of its 
accumulation in the atmosphere (like SRM approaches). But what has caused such 
high levels of atmospheric CO2 in the first place? CDR technologies do not prevent 
fossil fuels from being burnt – and so they tackle the „cause‟ of climate change in only 
a narrow sense of the word. Being cautious with descriptions and visual depictions of 
these as-yet-undeveloped technologies is imperative, and one way of 
circumnavigating potential problems is to pre-test images and language for perceived 
associations. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The „Experiment Earth?‟ project was the first systematic attempt at upstream public 
engagement on geoengineering in the UK. The purpose of the current paper was to 
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reflect on the framing, process, methods and findings of the „Experiment Earth?‟ 
project, and offer a set of recommendations for future public engagement on this 
topic. In many ways, „Experiment Earth?‟ should be considered a success – 
methodologically and in terms of the level of engagement achieved with participants 
(this is also the conclusion reached in the official evaluation report of the project – 
Collingwood Environmental Planning Limited, 2011). It seems clear that participants, 
researchers and funders learnt valuable lessons from the process, and it has provided a 
valuable platform on which to explore the issues around geoengineering in more 
depth in subsequent public engagement initiatives. 
 
However, we also identified a number of issues that should be addressed in 
subsequent public engagement research – in terms of the information provided to 
participants, the way in which it was framed, the structure of the deliberation process 
and the use of particular terminology or imagery. The challenge of developing a 
methodologically sound format for upstream public engagement is an ongoing and 
reciprocal process. Practical experience in the field gives invaluable guidance about 
„what works‟, while theoretical insights and opportunities for reflection allow 
practical procedures to be refined. 
 
In subsequent work planned by the Cardiff University Understanding Risk Group, we 
seek to investigate in much greater depth the complex issues around framing, 
language and imagery that we have touched on in this working paper. Using both 
participatory methods of engagement (similar to those employed in „Experiment 
Earth?‟) and more experimental, quantitative approaches (trialling and measuring the 
impact of different framings and portrayals of geoengineering technologies), we hope 
to answer some of the questions we have raised here. But identifying these pertinent 
avenues of investigation would not have been possible without the case study of 
„Experiment Earth?‟ to learn from. 
 
Over the coming decades, the possibility of developing and deploying geoengineering 
technologies will be defined by the decisions that societies have made about how to 
respond to climate change. Sufficiently radical mitigation and adaptation measures 
may negate the need for geoengineering. Inadequate attempts to reduce emissions of 
CO2 may make some form of geoengineering all but inevitable if we wish to avoid 
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the predicted effects of „dangerous‟ climate change. Or, geoengineering may remain 
such a daunting prospect that even the effects of dangerous climate change are 
deemed less risky than the possible unintended consequences of geoengineering the 
climate. The window of opportunity for making these societal decision is rapidly 
closing – but it is not yet shut. This means that there is a critical role for upstream 
public engagement to play in allowing at least some members of the public – outside 
of the political and democratic elites – to contribute to the conversation about whether 
or not to conduct „Experiment Earth‟. 
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